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The Long Commission, which investigated the terrorist bombing
of the Beirut Marine barracks, recommended punitive action
against officers in the chain of command. The president,
however, ruled out courts-martial. This article examines the
concept of command accountability and the role of the military
justice system.
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MILITARY REVIEW

Professional dereliction and incompetence have rarely been
punished since World War II. . . . Failure to do so has bred an atmosphere of professional unaccountability that encourages,
because it does not penalize, repetition of failure on the
battlefield’

INTRODUCTION

I

N LATE December 1983, tbe “DOD
Commission on tbe Beirut Interriationaf Airport Terrorist Act, October 23,
1983,” chaired by Admiral Robert L. J.
Long, US Navy, Retired, issued its report.
The Long Commission,
as it became
known, found that the military officers in
the chain of command were responsible
for ths security failure which resulted in
the deathe of 241 Marines when a terrorist truck-bomb
exploded
in their
Beirut, Lebanon, compound? Tbe $omrrrission recommended that appropriate
administrative or disciplinary action be
taken against these commanders.’ Nevertheless, President Ronald Reagan, saying
that the commanders had “already suffered quite enough,” ruled out courtsmsrtial for the officers and accepted the
reeponeibility for the disaster himself.’
The president’s decision brought immediate
criticism.
One unidentified
former senior military officer was quoted
in The New York Times as saying of the
president’s action:
I’m astonished that he moved so quickly to pre-empt the possibility
of formal
punishment.
If the system isn ‘t given a
chance to establish accountability,
how
can you expect officers to fear the result of
failure?’
a Wall Street
Journal
Similarly,
editorird argued:
In relieuing the military of even its
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minimum responsibilities,
the President
is suggesting
that it has no responsibilities at all That is anything but a
recipe for avoiding new military em bar
rassments in the future. ”

ANALYSIS

OF THE POTENTIAL OFFENSES

The
Uniform
Code
of Military
Justice–or code–has no provision deeling exclusively with command accountability. Yet, at least three provisions of
the code could apply to the commanders
in the Beirut case Article 92, dereliction
of duty’ Article 134, homicide based on
simple negligences;n and Article
99,
misbehavior before the enemy.g. These nrticles state offenses which have no
parallel in civilian criminal law. Likewise,
these offenses share another unique
characteristic—criminal liability based on
a showing of only simple negligence.
Simple Negligence Standard
Nothing
in the Long
Commission
Report suggests that the Beirut commanders could be blamed for anything
more than simple negligence. However,
the House Armed Services Committee
concluded in its separate investigation
that “very serious errors in judgment”
had occurred.’” Although this conclusion
indicates a greater degree of liabUity. the
factual findings indicating only simple
negligence were similar to the findings of

February

MILITARY JUSTICE
the Long Commission.”
Still, simple negligence mekes criminal
a wide range of conduct requiring proof of
only a elight deviation from acceptable
standards. Colonel William Winthrop, in
his classic treatise, AIilitary
Law and
Precedents, defined it to include the “improper” execution of orders, the failure to
take’ ‘proper precautions” and not’ ‘doing
the beet” in a given military situation.’z
The current Manual for Courts-Martial” is similarly broad in its explanation,
describing simple negligence as a “lack of
that degree of care which a reasonably
prudent person would have” exercised
under the same or similar
circumstances.’’” This definition, found in the
discussion of Article 92, is altered slightly
in the discussion of Article 99 wherein
simple negligence is described as the
“absence of conduct which would have
been taken by a reasonably careful person.’’”
Similarly,
the explanation
of
negligent homicide under Article 134 uses
the “reasonably careful’ ‘“ language.
Despite these minor variations, the
phraeee describe, as law Profeseor William L. Proeeer puts it, a standard of conduct not of “any ordinary individual, who
might occasionally
do unreasonable
things; he is a prudent and careful man,
who is always up to standard.’’”
It is
against this standard that the Beirut
commanders must be judged.
Dereliction of Duty
The most common offense suggested by
Jeffery Record and the other critics ie
dereliction of duty. It is important to note
that the evaluation of a supposed dereliction must be based on the facts as they appeared at the time of the atleged offense,
not afterward. As the Army Board of
Review stated in the United States v.
Ferguson, ‘8 “In testing for negligence the

law does not substitute hindeight for
foresight.” This case also held that a commander does not have to be more than
“reasonable” to escape criminal liability.
Conceding that the commander “could
have done more,’” the board, nevertheless,
revereed Lieutenant Fergnson’e dereliction conviction for not sufficiently briefing a subordinate on a safety mat~er.’~
Contrary to the trial court, the board
found the cQmmander’s actions minimally
adequate.
Lack of malicious intent doee nol excuse the offense, however. -For example,
Major
General
Robert W. Grow, a
militmy attache to the Soviet Union, was
convicted of dereliction of duty for failing
to secure his personal diary.’” Included in
it were references to materieJ which was
technically classified. Because the same
information was widely availabl@ in the
media, the general treated his memoir as
if it were” a copy of the Saturday Evening
Post.’’”
Unfortunately for the general,
persons unknown photocopied the diary,
and embarrassing excerpts appeared in an
East German paper. Parenthetically, this
case also serves as a precedent for prosecuting a senior officer For ‘what may be
regarded, because of its maximum penalty of only three monthe’ confinement, as a
relatively minor offense.’z
Negligent Homicide
A more serious charge against the
Beirut commanders would be negligent
homicide under Article 134. Punishable
by up to one year in prison for each
death;’ thie offense usee essentirdly the
same eimple negligence standmd. In the
United States u. Kick ?4 the Court of
Military
Appeale
acknowledged
that
criminal liability for crimes baeed on simple negligence was virtually unknown in
civilian law. The court, nevertheless, af-
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firmed the conviction
by citing the
‘‘ speciaf need in the military to make the
killing of another as a result of simple
negligence a criminal act. ‘“5 Because of
the use of weapons, explosives and other
dangerous instruments, the court found
that “societ y demands protection.’ ‘Z’
Despite this judicial acknowledgment
of the speciaf need for accountability in
the military, no published case reports the
prosecution of a commander
for. the
negligent homicide of his troops. Very
fikely, this omission is simply the result of
a reluctance to extend criminaf responsibility to a commander for an act which,
as in the Beirut case, was initiated by an
enemy. Nonetheless,
no legal barrier
prevents such a prosecution if the commander’s negligence played, in the words
of the Court of Military
Appeals, a
“material role in the victim’s decease.’‘“
Misbehavior Before the Enemy
,
By far, the most serious of the potentiaf
charges against the Beirut commanders is
the one posed by Article 99. This article,
which provides for the imposition of the
death penalty,” prohibits several forms of
misbehavior before the enemy. It condemns military personnel who, through
“neglect,
endanger the safety of any
. . . command.’ ‘“
The Manual for Courts-Martial explains
that the “before the enemy” element is
not defined in terms of distance but is a
tactical relation which would include at
least the ground commanders in Beirut.’”
“Enemy” is loosely defined to include any
“hostile
body. ” For example, in the
United States
v. Monday,
the 1965
Dominican Republic operation, resembling in many ways the Beirut situation,
fulfilled the Article 99 prerequisites.”
As the examination of these three Wtitles of the code has shown, a court-
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martiaf, if it came to the same conclusions
as the Long Commission, could lawfidly
adjudge long prison terms for the Beirut.
commanders. Indeed, the ground commanders could face the ultimate punishment—execution. Nevertheless, no triai
will take place despite the seriousness of
the potentiaf charges. The support for this
decision demands examination.

ANALYTICAL

SUPPORT FOR THE OECISION

Purpose of the Military Justice System
The purpose of the military justice
system is broader than that of the civilian
syetem. As Captain Edward M. Byrne observes in his book Military .Law:
civilian criminal law seeks to restrict
and regulate behauior so that people can
live together in peace and tranquility.
Military justice has a similar and yet
more positive purpose. Military justice
must, of necessity, promote good order,
high morale, and discipline. 3’
The goal of this “more
positive
purpose” is to achieve the military rniesion. The entire rationale of the military’
justice system is to help provide the na
tion with a force capable of winning wars.
Therefore. the paramount factor in mili.
tary justice decisions should be the interests of the military mission.
The US Supreme Court has readily acknowledged the primacy of the military
mission over individual interests. In the
often-quoted case of Burns u. Wilson, the
court said, “The rights of men in the
armed forces must perforce be conditioned
to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty.’”3 Of course, a military
member still has a right to a fair trial requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. But the decision to refer a case to
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trial where, as in the Beirut case. reasonable evidence of individual guilt exists is
entirely at the discretion of the courtmartial convening authority. Such a decision should be based on clear military interests sad should not be clouded by subjective perceptions that those accused
had “already suffered quite enough. ”
Regardless of the evidence of guilt,
nothing in the code or the Manual “for
Courts-Martial
requires the convening
authority to refer a particular case to
trial. In fact, the manual merely states
that a commander “may refer” a charge
but is “not obliged”’ to do S0.’4In practice,
many cases are disposed of administratively, as was the Beirut case when three
commanders
received
“letters
of
caution.’ ‘“ Other command accountability cases are resolved through the expediency of the relief of command. ” To determine whether a court-msrtiol is neces
sary, a judgment must be made that
court-mwtial punishment would enhance
the military’s ability to accomplish its
mission.
Rehabilitation
Court-mmtial punishment traditionally
addresses three theories: rehabilitation,
deter~ence and retribution.”
Rehabilitation by court. martial punishment is seldom appropriate in command accountability cases based on simple negligence.
For example. bebavior modification, often
a goal of rehabilitation,
is not easily
adapted to these cases. For most commanders, such as those in the Beirut case,
there is simply no pattern of criminal behavior to modify. Besides, a conviction
would virtually end the chances of those
accused for further command, and this
could very well be harmful to the military
mission.
Commanders, including those in the
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Beirut case, are usually highly trained
snd motivated
professionrds— valuable
assets to the military mission. Genersf Sir
John Hackett. a much decorated former
British axmy commander, suggests that a
failed commander given another chance is
a “wonderful investment. ” He explainx
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Thus, it appears that the rehabilitation
theory may best be served in the Beirut
case by returning the commanders to duty

Deterrence is the theory most attractive to the critics of the Beirut decision.
Presumably, the hsrsh punishment of
those commanders would deter others
from making similar mistakes. The end result of this process would be, theoretically, more competent, effective leaders.
As attractive as this may sound, caxeful
analysis shows that the qesult may well be
just the opposite. Consider the Soviet
model.
The Soviets employ a deterrence theory
in dealing
with their commanders.
JMiIitary
analyst
Andrew
Cockborn
reports that Soviet officers at all levels of
command fear stiff punishments for even
minor transgressions.”
As a result. officers cover up errors and, even wor++e
from the standpoint of military effectiveness, initiative is bluntedfi”
The Soviets do, however, recognize the
practicaI military difficulty their approach
raiees. Colonel General Oleg Kulishev
pleaded in sn srticle in the SOuiet Mititary
Reuieu, for punishment for the officer who
is “afraid” to take responsibility, “not the
one who showed initiative but did not
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achieve
success.””’
Nevertheless,
Cockborn says the reformers are making
little progress in fostering
initiative
among Soviet officers.”
Furthermore, the US Supreme Court
recognizes that the fear of a legal penalty
can undermine a commander’s
effectiveness. In barring lawsuits by enlisted
personnel against commanders for alleged
constitutional violations, the court, in the
1983 case of Chappell v. Wallace, cited
“the special nature of military life” and
the “need for unhesitating and decisive
action by military officers” as the rationale for its decision.” Likewise, Martin
Blumenson and James L. Stokeebury
point out in their book, Masters of the Art
of Command, that officers who constantly
look “over their shoulder to see whether
the ax is about to fall we diverting attention and energy from the more important
matters on the battlefield.’‘“
Crirninsf action against comman-ders
for simple negligence could also greatly
aggravate what is widely viewed’s as one
of the most serious problems facing the
military
today—careerism.
Excessive
anxiety about one’s career is an attitude
sometimes attributed to military commanders. According to psychologist Norman F. Dixon, in military organizations,
“the penrdt y for error is very much more
substantial than the reward for success.’”g
Dixon believes that this negative reinforcement breede a fear of failure that
stifles good leadership.” Certainly, any
punishment would tend to feed this fear,
but the prosecution of the Beirut commanders based on simple negligence
would likely result in a new and even
greater level of anxiety among commanders.
The probable
consequence
would be less effectiveness in officers
faced with comruand mrder similarly trying circumstances.
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As we have see;, the deterrence concept
might well succeed in causing other commanders to change their actions. But the
military benefit of such a change is
dubious at best. Since court-msi-tialing
the Beirut commanders to deter others
would not produce the khd of leader the
military
needs, the military
justice
system would not have been served by
such a prosecution.
Retribution
Retribution is the theory of punishment
most applicable to command accountability cases. Byrne defines it as “the concept
that a person has an ultimate responeibil.
ity for hie acts and, if he has committed
a crime, deservee punishment. ‘“s In
military terms, tbe failure to exact retribution through appropriate channels
can have ~ devastating effect on morale.
Witness the fact that US officers were
assassinated in Vietnam by their own
troops,,, Reasons for thie eitUatiOn were
vsried and complex, but at least part of
the blame lay in the apparent perception
that the system was not dealing with officers who were unnecessarily ricking the
fives of their troope. ‘o In the Beirut case,
however, there is nQ evidence of such a
perception. In fact, a prosecution might
well have hurt the morale of the Marine
Corps, and this possibility, according to
The Neul York Times, was a factor in the
president’s decision.”
Another factor The llmes reported wae
the president’s desire to minimize the impact of the Long Commission Report on
his policy in Lebanon.” Similarly, analyst
Patrick J. Sloyan suggeste that the president wanted to avoid airing at a courtmartinl an alleged diepute between tbe
Joint Chiefs of Staff smd the White House
over the role of the Marines in his Middle
East policy.” Despite implications to the

Febnrar~

MILITARY JUSTICE
contrary, the desire to avoid negative
public opinion is a legitimate consideration in command accountability cases.
Clearly, public support and confidence are
in the interests of tbe military. Colonel
Harry G. Summers Jr., in his book On
Strategy: ACritical Ana[ysis of the Vietnam War, sees public support as akeyto
the successful use of military force.”
Therefore, if retribution by means of a
court-martial is necessary to retain public
confidence in the military, then, this
theory should predominate in command
accountability cases.
In cases such as that of Beirut in which
a lmge number of lives were lost, the
public may find any disposition short of
court-martial unacceptable. Administrative actions, as devastating as they may
be for the officers personally, may be
perceived by the public as a mere’ ‘slap on
the wrist.’’” However, unlike deterrence,
there have been no calls for retribution in
the Beirut case. Still, ademandforret,ribution by the public could have justified a
different decision. This would not be
“scapegoating”
because scapegoating implies the prosecution of innocent persons
which, if the Long Commission’e findings
are correct, is not the case with tbe Beirut
commanders.
The “X”

Factor

Besides the traditional
theoriee of
court-martial punishment, an additional
factor must be considered in the decision
to refer a command accountability case to
trial—the unpredictability
of the outcome, or the x factor. Membere of a courtmertial panel may decide not to convict
an individurd despite seemingly
conclusive evidence of guilt. They may also<
decide to adjudge little or no punishment
even if they do bring a conviction. Both of
these phenomena occurred in tbe courts
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martial which resulted from the collision
of the USSBelknap
and the carrier USS
John F. Kennedy in 1975.50
In the military justice system, the commander’s fate is decided by other military
officers. Current Chief Judge of tbe Court
of Military Appeals Robinson Everett explains that, eince militwy
juries are
drawn from tbesameprofeeeion,
tbereis
“a much higher probability that the persons who hear the case will understand
and be responsive to the probleme involved.’ ‘“ In tbe Beirut case, few military
professionals apart from the Long Commission were criticafof tbe commanders’
performance. In epite of the evidence and
the relatively easy legal standard involved, a prosecution before fellow officers cognizant of the difficult miesion
the commanders faced might well have
been fruitless.
Tbe decieionmaker must consider the
damaging effects of a potentially unsucceeeful projection. The public may con”sider it a self-serving whitewash b~ the
military, while themilitary may conclude
that the outcome eviscerates the concept
of command accountabilit.y. The severity
of these effects on the military mission
may well lead a decisionmsker to conclude
that prosecution is ill-advised.

We bave now considered why thedecision not to court-martial the Beirut commanders, even assuming their guilt, was
warranted in the intereste of both the
militmy mission and the military justice
system. All commanders should be aware
of their vulnerability tocriminrd charges
under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice because of the simple negligence
standard.
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him out. He the; commanded a lictor to
prepare his axe; and after waiting in
silence until the axe was ready— while of
course the praetor stood aghast expecting
the next command to be for his execution —Papin”us continues
to the lictor:
‘Come, cut this root; someone will stumble
on it. “n
Clearly, a court-martial is a potent tool
with which to enforce command accountability. It can present a convenient and
enticing option to the decisionmelter who
is faced with a military tragedy. But, as
the analysis of the Beirut case shows, it
may very well be the wiser man who
forgoes its use.

Rather then setting a precedent of absolving commanders of their account ability, the Beirut proceedings merely reaffirm the principle that each case must be
decided upon its own particular set of
facts and circumstances. As we have seen,
the code provides stiff punishments to enforce accountabilityy. Yet those punishments need not always be, imposed to
have the desired effect as this account by
the ancient historian, Livy, illustrates:
In the Sammite wars a certain Praenesfi”nepraetor had been slow in bringing up
the reserves. When back in camp after the
battle the Roman commander, Papirius
Cursor, came to thepraetor’s tent and called

NOTES
1 Jeffrey
New,
2

,%.0,0,

1, Amer,ca, of f,,,,

Corc,s I“, D,?

us

& Wor10 RePort. 27 February
?984 P 38
ReDort of the DOD Cornnu,s,on o“ ,“,

Be,,., ,“, !?,”.,,O ”.,
A,mo,t Terrcmst Act October 23 1’383 Con@ssmnar Record
98th Con.
ate.s, Sec..a
S.ss,0.
us Go.er.ment P,,.tmg Owce
Wa,h, n.ton D C .30 Jan..,”
1984 D S360
3 Ibi
4 ,Tran,c,,Pl
of Pre,, dent s New. Co” fere”ce 0“ Attack 0“
F.iactneBarracks
me New ‘for. Tmws, 28 December 1983 ,?Ai 1
5 PhtllIP Ta.lernan, Reagans T,rm.g aPe Reasons Protect ,ng
Corm,, The New York T,mes 28 December 1983 D AIO
29 December
8 The Easy Way out, The war! Street Jo.r..l
1983, P 12
7 Umform
Cow
.1 MC!,IWY Just,...
Article 92, Publ,c La* 506,
Act .1 May 5, 1950 84 STAT 108 (84 S!,1.1,s at Large 108), 10 uSC
892 (Tllle 10, US Code Sect,On 892111976)
8 umtorrn Code.1 MJilarY J.sfme. Arucle ?34, P.bI,c Law 506,
Act .1 May 5, 1950, 64 STAT 108, 10 uSC 934 (1976)
9 Un,form COU. 01 M!lItarY J.,!,,,
Artrcle 99 PUQI,CLaw 506
A.! .1 May 5, 1950, 64 STAT 108 70 uSC 899 {1976)
10 Joel Brmklev
House St.ov Frnti$ Omcers a! Fault m Bern.!
BombmQ, The Ne* York T-me, “20 Der..rnl)er 1983 II A 1

52

11 JO,, 8rmk@y
Reagan Assert, Blame ,, HC, m Marc”,
Secur,t, Fa,lure OPtmse, Pun,sh, ng Of f,cer,
The New VW*
T,mes, 28 December 4983 D AIO
12 colonel W!lllam WI. NWOD,
M,l,tary Law ..0 Precerwmfs, Sec
ond Earlron US Government Prrnt, ng Ofl,ce Was.n,nqmo D C
1920 P 722
13 Manual for Co.rfs Marl/&l Un7fed Stales, 7984 US Govern
m.”! Prm, !ng Olf!Ce, W,sh, ngton D C 1984
14. ,b,o Part 1“ Par,graPh 16,,31,0
,5 ,b,o Daragraoh 23,,3),.)
16 )t,,o D,regraDh 85.{2)
,7 W,,,, am L Pros,,,, ‘,,”/ o! 10,,,
F.”,, h Ed,,,.”
We,,
P“ol,, hmg Co St Paul M,.”
197? P ,51
18 Umteti S1. [.s , Ferg.. w”, 12 CMR 570 (Court Mart, al
Renorts, volume 12 p 5701 @ B R (Army BOara of Revmvl 1953)
L)576
19 )0,0
20

u.,,,(J

M,lct.rv
21
22

m

57677
.$,a,es

AD Deals

v G,..,

IV, D,ragraDh

11 cMR

77, 3 uSCMA

77 {uS Court

of

Volume 3, D 77), 1953) D 80

ILld
P 86
Manual
!0, Courts

Martral

U“f,ed

S,.,.

s

7984

OP c,,

Pa,t

16e[3uA1

February

‘

MILITARY JUSTICE
23 ]b!#
DaraQraPh
85,
24 “n,,ed
S,.,,,
. K,ck,

7 M J

Volume
7, P 82), (C M A (Court
25 lb?d c, 84
26

!0,0

27
28

U“!,,O
Stale,
u“!lorm
Coce

v Romero
.1 M,,,!.,”

29

lb!O

o” 3

,“bsect,

30 Wan”. ! for Coi,;
IV. pa,agrac,h
23,( 1,,.)

w

,M,,, tary

of M,,,tar”

.!”s,,.,

Al) Pealsl

ReI)orter,

19791

1 M J 227 [C M A 1979)
J.,,,..,
Artrcle 99, w
c,,

M.,?(.1

unr,e@ States,

?984

00

,,,

Pa,,

B R t9651
32 CaOta, n Eflw,d
M Byrne M,,>,.,” Lam Th#rOEd,t,on Naval
I“,,,tu, e P,,,,
A...vo I,s, Md 1981, II 1
346 U S 137 W 5 S.meme
Go”,,
ReDorts
33 8“7”s “. W,{,.”,
Volume 3460 137) 97 L EO 1.508 ,Lamyer, Ed,,,.”, Volume 97
D , 508) 73 s C, 1045 ,SuDreme Court. ‘/01””,
73 P 1,045)11953)
0140
31

“.,,..7

34

Men..,

S,,,.s

,.,

v Mood,”.

Co.,,,

36 CMR

Mar,<,,,

u“,,ed

711 [A

S!,,,s

?984,

R C M

601

(d)(l) [Rules of Courts Mart,,,, R.1.601(w$,1
35 Pat,,.,
J S,.,,.
P,,., ,.0
Leoge, S,.,
36
A,,

.1

The M,.,,,,,
15 Ac),, ,984

of Lebanon
D C2

Ma,,,.
B1. frwn,o”
and Jarrws 1 St.k,Sl)”r”
COmma.@
Houghton M,tt!, n Co 8.,,.”

The “,,g,n,an
Ma, t.rs

Ma,,

of ,.,
1976.

cm 38? 74
37 Byrne.
38 Genera,

OD ,>, cm 8.85
S,. Jo”” H,.k,lt
r“, Prole,, m” 01Atms Mac, ?,,,.”
CO N V 1983 w 2202?
39 A.IX,W Cocklmrn
The 1.,,,,
,“. >0, ,., S.,<,, I,4,,,,a,”
Mac”,.,
Random Ho.,, ,“.
N Y 1983, on 5763
40 ,b,d p 175
4, CO,..,, Genera, O,eQ Ku,,,,,.
.1”. Commander s Re,Don
Rev,,,,
F. b,.a,y
1982 p ,5
,<D,III” S..,,, M,,,,.,?

...
?>

42 CocKborn, 0/7 .(1 D 178,
43 C.appe,! , Wallace, U S ,76 L Ed Second EO,tlo”, P 586, 103
s Gt [1983), Q 593
44 Bl”rnenson ,“0 StOkeSb”ry, w .>, D 368
45 Lleutena”t Colonel G E Secrlst. ..Defective Lea@shio
America,, G,eate,t Per,,
A,r un#vers,ty !?ewew. ~eDlember.
October 1983 013
46 Norman F D,xon, 0“ the P,”ChOIPg” o! M!l(tar” I“
comDe!ence, 0.s4. Books. N Y 1976, D 222
47 lbtd
48

8y,ne,

w

.,1,

D 85

49 Richarti
A Gabr, el,
What the Army Learneo From
,“0
LwO,,SII!I).
Armed Force,
Bus, ”,,,,.
4S10 Pm fessrona,,sm
S1.11College, Norfolk. w, Swtember 1983, D 105
50 R(ChWO A QaQr,el and L1.”te”a”t
Colonel Paul L Savage,
Cr,sls m Conmane Mlsm..agemeni m the Army, Htl! c. Wang 1..,
N Y 197S, PD .344
51 Ta.[eman OD c,,
52 lbro
53
54

Slo”a”, w

cl:
ktamy

.2.10”,1

A..!vs!$

G

.1 the V!efnam

Summer,
war,

J.,

Pre,rdm

On

Slr.,egv

A

Press

Nova..

Caltf

Cr(t) c.!
1982

I) 18
55

Captain

Gou.tau,l, ty
56

lb@,

John E Greenbacker
The cruel Business of AC
Pmceeomgs,
Aug.st
1977 P 29
US Naval mwl.te

P 27

57 Rooms..
0
me Umfed sfa!es,
1956, D 5
58

Press

Colonel

Everett,
M!lltarY

M,l!f.rY
service

C F Sra.d
Roman
Aust(n, 1,..s
1968

dust,..!.

the Armed

P.bllshlw
hhl,t.rv

Law

Forces

Co, .arrmDur9
Un,versw

of

Pa.

Of Te.as

Major Charles J Dunlap Jr, USA ir Force, is
the staff judge aduocate. 97th Combat Support
Group I. Strategic Am Command), Blytheudle
Air
Force Base, Arkansas
He receiued a B A from
St Jow-ph’s
Untuersrty
and a J L) from Vd
Imtoua Umuerstty
and M a graduate
of the
Armed
Fomes
Staff College
He PW”KJU+’
sewed u the chief of the Mhtay
Justine Dzw
start Au- Force Judge Aduocate
General School
Ma.ru.dl Am T.’ome Baw, Alabama

Tuition Assistance. Scheduled

changes to the Army’s Tuition
Assistance
Program that would have cut benefits and required
soldiers to use their GI Bill while still on active duty have been
canceled.
A restoration
of budget funds now allows the Army
to keep tuition
assistance
rates and policy unchanged.
The
proposed
changes, which would have taken effect in October
1984, would have required
soldiers
to use GI Bill benefits
before becoming
eligible
for tuition
assistance.
The current
rates now in effect are at the maximum congressional
limits—
90 percent and above for soldiers E5 and above with less than
14 years’ service and 75 percent for all others.
Soldiers
who are eligible
for assistance
under the GI Bill
should still consider
using it while in the service. Benefits
under the GI Bill expire 31 Decembar
1989, and extension
beyond that date is uncertain.
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